extensive damage the Alabama had done to Union shipping during the American Civil War became part of the negotiations for the 1871 Treaty of Washington. While the American government wanted compensation for the actions of a British-built ship, the American case was complicated by the unfortunate fact that international law provided 'no clear ruling as to the duties of neutrals with regard to the construction of belligerent warships'.5 Britain agreed to arbitration over a monetary award only to salvage relations with the USA, but declared that it had violated no principles of international law. The Treaty of Washington included an explicit declaration that 'a neutral government is bound [to exercise] due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming or equipping' of vessels intended to make war against states with which it is at peace. The British government, however, included a reservation in the Treaty marking this as a new understanding, not one that had bound it during the Civil War. According to the Treaty, the British government 'cannot assent to the foregoing rules as a statement of principles of international law which were in force at the time' when the Alabama claims arose. While the USA and Britain agreed 'to observe these rules as between themselves in the future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite them to accede to them', this meant that those principles were an accord between two states, not general international law. 6 The 1890 Brussels convention introduced the international efforts to regulate the arms trade that prefigured later League of Nations action by establishing tight controls over the arms traffic in Africa. Ironically, the Brussels convention aimed not at arms trafficking but at ending the slave trade in Africa and ensuring stability in European possessions there, extending the earlier efforts of the 1885 Berlin Conference.7 Restricting the flow of arms was a means to that end and applied only to a particular and limited section of the earth's surface -curbs on the arms trade in a particular region merely underlined a more general freedom to trade. The convention, signed by the USA and all colonial powers, agreed that the best means to end the slave trade was tighter control 'under the sovereignty or the protectorate of civilized nations' through an improved network of fortifications and transportation links. Businessmen, manufacturers, and other non-state actors were, however, as free as states were restricted. Though the 1907 Conference forbade state supply of arms to belligerents, it explicitly preserved the right of private suppliers, in whatever state they might reside, to sell arms to whomever they pleased. While neutral states could restrict the actions of their citizens and subjects, they were under no obligation to do so. The 13th Convention held that: 'A neutral state is not bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either belligerent, of arms, ammunition, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet.' The 5th Convention, on neutrals in land warfare, used almost identical language: 'A neutral power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or fleet.' The Alabama case and the Treaty of Washington had not substantially altered international understanding of the right to trade in arms.10
The Hague Conference appealed to precedent and practicality. 'The practice has become established', the Third Commission found, 'that a neutral state is not bound to prevent the export of arms or ammunition destined for one or other of the belligerents.' James Brown Scott agreed: 'Does a strict and progressive neutrality prevent its subjects or citizens from doing the acts which the State is specifically forbidden to do[?] .... Practice recognizes, and rightly so, a distinction between the intervention of the State and the activity of the individual.' The Second Commission, handling land warfare, worked from the principle that neutral states must not suffer consequences from conflicts to which they are not party, and 'any obligation [to halt arms exports] laid upon 
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Stone: The League of Nations' Drive to Control the Global Arms Trade a license from the exporting state. Smaller, non-producing states found this unacceptable as free export was essential to their security. As even Merchants of Death itself concedes, the League of Nations' effort to control the international trade 'was dominated by the insistence of the nonproducing countries that the producing countries must sell'. Otherwise, 'the non-producing countries would look upon [nationalization of arms manufacture] as a hostile act of the producing countries, to whose tender -or otherwise -mercies they would thereby be committed in a warring world'.33
On the second day of the Conference's deliberations, the illusion of consensus over licensing was shattered. El Salvador's J. Gustavo Guerrero, vicepresident of the Conference, re-opened issues raised in drafting the Convention's text, and prefigured the chief complaint of the non-producers: any restrictions on the arms trade put smaller states at the mercy of producers. 'It will', he declared, 'be difficult to bring our task to a satisfactory conclusion if we seek to render countries which do not produce arms dependent in some sense on the exporting countries and to create . Representatives of other small states resented the right of producergovernments to decide through the power of licensing whether private manufacturers could supply them with arms. Greece's delegate to the League, Vassili Dendramis warned that under licensing ... a kind of condominium of the great States will be set up over the small non-producing States, which will, in reality, come under the control of the great. They will be at their mercy; they will be subjected to such economic and political conditions as may be imposed on them. 
